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1. Ethics and the environment 
One of the defining features of our era will be the way in which humanity deals with 
environmental challenges. We are faced with the threat that due to human activities, there will be 
climatological changes which will affect the entire planet, causing harm to millions if not billions 
of people and leading to massive species extinction. But anthropogenic climate change is only 
one among many interrelated environmental problems. Every day there is news of the 
environmental impacts of natural resource extraction, or of the treatment of animals in industrial 
farms, or of species extinction, or of genetically modified organisms, or of limitations in the 
supply of clean water, to give just a few examples. In more general terms, the challenge to be 
sustainable is one of the core ethical issues of our time. The environmental movement in the 
West is not a new movement, but humanity faces a critical moment in confronting the challenges 
we face. 
These issues are making the headlines, but behind the scenes, philosophers are working 
on questions both directly within environmental ethics as well as on more general questions in 
ethical theory which can apply to these issues. Environmental ethics has been and continues to be 
an exciting area of growth within philosophy. The last decade has seen a steady increase in the 
number of journals, books, and classes devoted to the subject. For all that, environmental ethics 
remains a young sub-discipline, and for various reasons, it has been to a significant degree 
marginalized as a sub-discipline within philosophical ethics. However, not only are issues of 
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environmental ethics of the highest import in today’s world, there is room for much fruitful work 
in connecting issues in environmental ethics with the best work in contemporary normative 
theory. Both environmental ethics and ethical theory have much to gain from increased 
interaction, and this book is an effort to promote such dialogue. 
Richard Sylvan’s article (1973) “Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?” is 
heralded as beginning a new era for environmental thinking within Western philosophy. Sylvan 
argues against the anthropocentrism long dominant among ethical theorists. In his famous “Last 
People” example, Sylvan asks the reader to consider a science-fiction scenario in which people 
know that they will be unable to reproduce and that the human species will go extinct. If they 
were to also destroy all the forests and ecosystems and kill all the wild animals just for fun, they 
would have behaved wrongly, according to Sylvan. Sylvan concludes that what is needed is a 
new, non-anthropocentric environmental ethic, to explain the wrongness of such behavior. 
How should one react to Sylvan’s argument? There are three classes of response: 
A. Reject the intuition that the last people are acting wrongly. However, this response to Sylvan 
is legitimate only insofar as it can be justified on the basis of considerations independent of 
anthropocentric ethical theories. For Sylvan’s intention is to call these theories into question, and 
thus to use an anthropocentric theory to reject the intuition would simply be to beg the question.  
B. In accord with Sylvan’s exhortation, generate an entirely new ethical theory. This is what 
happened with Deep Ecology, a radical view according to which ethical behavior requires what 
Arne Naess (1989) calls “Self-realization”, which (in effect) is to realize that one is not 
independent of the rest of the world. True self-realization, according to Naess, is to realize that 
we are One with other species, and thus harming other species would be harming one’s Self. 
Although we will not try to defend or reject Deep Ecology here, it is based on highly disputable 
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metaphysical and ethical assumptions and thus does not have many supporters among 
philosophical ethicists. 
C. Adapt a traditional form of ethical theory to account for ethical concern for the non-human 
world. For instance, Tom Regan (1983) has argued on Kantian grounds that we owe respect to 
other individual advanced sentient animals, and Paul Taylor (1986) argues more generally that 
we owe respect to all living things. Thomas Hill, Jr., (1983) has argued that virtue ethics is the 
proper framework through which to apply environmental ethics, and others such as Ronald 
Sandler (2007) have developed a more complete environmental virtue ethic. Bryan Norton 
(2005) has developed an approach to environmental issues based upon the writings of the 
American pragmatists. And consequentialist views from Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic” (1980: 
262) to Peter Singer’s (1975) argument for the ethical treatment of non-human sentient animals 
have become well-known.  
We maintain that it is imperative that there be a more intensive focus on consequentialist 
environmental ethics. We believe that the consequentialist framework is the correct one in 
normative theory, and although there has been considerable work in applying consequentialist 
theory to environmental issues, it has been fragmented. Although this book does not have as its 
goal the development of a complete consequentialist environmental ethic (or even an unqualified 
endorsement of consequentialist environmental ethics), it is our hope that it encompasses in a 
systematic way a discussion of at least most of the facets of a well-developed consequentialist 
environmental ethic. 
 
2. What Is consequentialism? 
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 “Consequentialism,” Amartya Sen once quipped, is “not a prepossessing term” (1999: 
58). Indeed, it is not, though the term has become indispensable in contemporary ethical theory, 
and it is central to the approaches to environmental ethics taken in this volume. So it’s natural to 
ask: What, if anything, is unique about the consequentialist point of view? Our answer is 
ecumenical and aims to be as comprehensive as possible. As we see it, the term 
“consequentialist” refers to anyone who holds that the rightness or wrongness of an agent's 
action depends solely on the value of the consequences of this action, compared to the value of 
the consequences of any other actions which the agent could have undertaken (Kagan 1998: 60-
61, Hurka 2003: 4, and Shaw 2006: 5). That's a mouthful, but we'll spend some time unpacking 
that idea in the rest of this section. 
 Consequentialists often disagree with one another about the details of the relationship 
between the rightness or wrongness of an action and the goodness or badness of its 
consequences. That said, many of these details are not central to this book, and, for this reason, 
we shall be highly selective in our discussion of them in this introduction. We will not, of course, 
resolve any of these disagreements here, but we will highlight ways in which they are especially 
salient to those interested in environmental ethics.1 
 One area of disagreement among consequentialists concerns whether we should evaluate 
the consequences of actions directly or indirectly. Those who believe that we should evaluate the 
consequences of actions directly are usually called “act consequentialists.” 
 
Act Consequentialism: It is morally right for agent A to do action F if and only if 
the value of the consequences of A's doing F is greater than the value of the 




Pigeonholing those who believe that we should evaluate the consequences of actions 
indirectly is a somewhat more complicated affair. Perhaps the most widely held version of 
indirect consequentialism is called “rule consequentialism.” Here is one statement of the view.  
 
Rule Consequentialism: It is morally right for A to do F if and only if the value of 
the consequences of accepting a set of rules which permits doing F is greater than 
the value of the consequences of A's society accepting any other set of rules. 
 
Rule consequentialists are indirect, rather than direct, consequentialists because they 
believe that the moral rightness of an action is a function of accepting the set of rules which 
permits the action rather than a function of the particular action itself. While there are other ways 
to be an indirect consequentialist – for example, Bradley (2005) and Sverdlik (2011) – we will 
leave this can of worms only partially opened. We would hazard the opinion that the vast 
majority of consequentialists are either act consequentialists or rule consequentialists, and it is 
primarily these two views which are in play in this volume. It is also worth admitting that act and 
rule consequentialists often agree in practice, if not in all aspects of theory. In most cases which 
we are likely to encounter, actions which bring about the best consequences on particular 
occasions are also the actions which are permitted by the set of rules, the acceptance of which 
would lead to the best results.  
Nevertheless, environmental issues are foremost among those that threaten to drive a 
wedge between direct and indirect forms of consequentialism. Consider one's use of non-
recyclable materials to pack a gift for a friend. It may make rather a lot of difference whether, on 
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the one hand, we think of the rightness or wrongness of this action as being determined by the 
value of consequences of one's using non-recyclable materials on this occasion or, on the other 
hand, we think of the rightness or wrongness of the action as being determined by the value of a 
moral code that permits everyone to act this way. 
 As the name suggests, what distinguishes consequentialism most sharply from other 
ethical theories is its focus on the consequences of actions (Williams 1973: 83-84 and Hooker 
2000: 33 n. 2). But clarification is required to understand what consequences are exactly. On one 
view, a consequentialist should be concerned with what is caused by, for example, an act of lying 
or stealing; she is not concerned with whether lying or stealing is bad or wrong in itself. Indeed, 
she is usually thought to hold that no action can be bad or wrong in itself. 
 However, some authors who express sympathy for consequentialism have, nevertheless, 
expressed doubts about whether this line of thought can be maintained (Crisp 2006: 40 n.7, Parfit 
2011: 22, and Hiller, this volume) and others have suggested that once these doubts have been 
taken to heart, we might use a term like “teleology” to replace “consequentialism” (Scanlon 
1998: 80 and Broome 2004:10). One might fear that this may put us on the road to perdition. For 
once we have made the move from the value of consequences to value more generally, we may 
lose track of the boundaries between various approaches to ethical theory. Alternatively, one 
might regard this result as a step forward – it may synthesize what is right in different types of 
ethical theory. Or one may claim that there are still important distinctions between 
consequentialism and non-consequentialism; in particular, consequentialists are those who claim 
that an evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of an act cannot be determined without 




Most of the papers in this volume put the emphasis squarely on the results of actions – 
and this is where most ethicists initially attracted to consequentialism believe it should be. When, 
for instance, we take up the question of the permissibility of factory farming, we typically are 
concerned with the positive and negative results of such a practice, not its intrinsic value or 
disvalue – whatever that would be. A little more specifically, we find it quite sensible to point to 
the disvalue in the suffering experienced by animals in factory farming and of the 1.4 billion tons 
of waste produced by it (Jamieson 2008: 122) as morally important consequences of the practice; 
perhaps these on their own suffice for changing society’s judgment that this practice is 
acceptable. One of us (Kahn) is dubious about any value or disvalue intrinsic to the practice of 
packing as many animals as possible into one space, but the other (Hiller) does view the intrinsic 
disvalue as an additional reason to rethink our farming practices. Clearly, this is not the place to 
settle the matter. 
 Another area of disagreement among consequentialists concerns whether we should be 
primarily concerned with the actual value of the consequences of actions or with the value they 
are expected to have by the agent at the time when the action is undertaken. A little more 
specifically, we can divide the warring parties into two camps. 
Actual Act Consequentialism: It is morally right for A to do action F if and only if 
the actual value of the consequences of A's doing F is greater than the actual value 
of the consequences of A's doing any other action available to her. 
Expected Act Consequentialism: It is morally right for A to do action F if and 
only if the expected value of the consequences of A's doing F is greater than the 
expected value of the consequences of A's doing any other action available to her. 
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Where the consequences of one's actions are reliably predictable, the differences between 
actual act consequentialism and expected act consequentialism are small. For example, the 
consequences of poisoning the town water supply are reliably predictable. Those who use the 
well will sicken and die, and the disvalue of these consequences is likely to be very large indeed. 
As a result both actual act consequentialism and expected act consequentialism will – thankfully 
– prohibit such an action.  
Yet matters are somewhat more complex when it comes, to take another example from 
environmental ethics, to global climate change. There is some fact of the matter about what the 
world climate will be like in 100 years, though at present we can at best specify a range of 
conditions with some degree of certainty (Garvey 2008: 91). So it is at least possible that we will 
enact policies now that will result in global catastrophe in the future, even if we act with the best 
of intentions. An actual act consequentialist would judge the rightness or wrongness of our 
enactment of policies now on the basis of the value which the actual consequences of this 
enactment will have in, say, 100 years. An expected act consequentialist would judge the 
rightness or wrongness of our enactment of policies now with reference to our current 
expectations regarding the value of the consequences of these actions. 
 A third important area of disagreement among consequentialists concerns what we'll call 
the nature of the good. Strictly speaking, consequentialism is a theory of the right (Brandt 1977: 
193 and Pettit 1990: 230). As we have seen, consequentialists hold that the moral rightness and 
wrongness of actions is solely a function of the goodness and badness of the consequences of 
these actions, whether understood directly or indirectly, in actual or expected terms. But in what 
does this goodness or badness consist? While consequentialists do not differ as consequentialists 
in their answer to this question, they do differ in non-trivial respects. Many consequentialists 
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hold that the good is correctly conceived solely as well-being. We will use the term “welfarist” 
for a consequentialist who embraces this thesis.4 
This raises two further questions: What is well-being, and whose well-being is relevant? 
We consider only some very general answers here for the purposes of sketching the terrain ahead 
for the readers of this volume.5 
With regard to the first question, we could do worse than begin by distinguishing 
between subjective and objective forms of welfarism (Railton 1984: 162). According to 
subjective welfarists, well-being is rooted in an experiential state such as pleasure or desire-
satisfaction (Mill [1863] 1998, Smart 1973, and Harsanyi 1977), while according to objective 
welfarists, well-being is to be found in what are often thought to be less obviously experiential 
states such as creativity, autonomy, and friendship (Moore 1903: 183-185, Brink 1989: 217, and 
Driver 2012: 22). Turning to the question of whose well-being counts in determining the good, 
we can distinguish inclusivist and exclusivist answers. Inclusivists tend to think that the well-
being of every sentient being matters (Bentham 1996 [1789] and Singer 1979: 48-71). 
Exclusivists, on the contrary are inclined to think of well-being as limited to human beings (Frey 
1980). One might think that those who reject welfarism should be called “anti-welfarists,” but 
this name would be highly misleading. Consequentialists who deny welfarism do not claim that 
well-being is not a factor in determining the good; rather, they are simply unpersuaded that well-
being is the only factor determining the good. Hence, it might be more accurate to call such 
individuals “extra-welfarists.” Some such welfarists include so-called prioritarians who believe 
that the good is determined, at least in part, by the way in which well-being is distributed 
(Arneson 2000 and Dorsey Forthcoming).  
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 At any rate, it is clear enough that a concern for issues within environmental ethics does 
much to push consequentialists to think very hard about the nature of the good and its relation to 
their theory (Singer 2002: 40-43). Can an exclusivist theory of the good do justice to questions 
raised about the survival of non-human animals? Does an extra-welfarist approach derive any 
advantage when considering whether we must conserve resources for future generations? Can an 
objectivist approach avoid concerns that she makes too sharp a distinction between us and our 
environment? Are consequentialist approaches which attribute a good to an entire species or to 
an ecosystem to be thought of as inclusivist or exclusivist? All of these questions are very much 
in play here.6  
 The majority of authors who write on ethical theory see utilitarianism as a special case of 
consequentialism (Donner 2006: 117 and Vallentye 2006: 21), though some have their doubts 
(e.g., Jacobson 2008). A little more specifically, the typical view is that a utilitarian is simply a 
consequentialist who is also a welfarist. Such a conjunction of theories provides no room for 
providing special weight, say, to the welfare of those who are least well off (Hooker 2000: 59 
and Parfit 2011: 373). As readers may have gathered for themselves already, we favor an easily 
digestible view of the relationship between these terms. Occasionally, authors use the term 
“utilitarianism” to mean something very close to what we mean by “consequentialism” (Bykvist 
2010). But we're not inclined to pick a fight over terminology alone, provided the use of the 
terms is sufficiently clear. 
 There is, of course, much more to be said about consequentialism than we can say in this 
introduction. We have aimed in this section to do no more than set out some of the fundamental 




3. Consequentialism and environmental ethics  
Perhaps surprisingly, given the prevalence of the consequentialist tradition in ethics over 
the last century, few philosophers whose work is primarily in environmental ethics explicitly 
avow consequentialism.7 One might speculate why this is so:  
(A) Utilitarianism has traditionally been seen by environmental ethicists as being 
anthropocentric, and in dismissing utilitarianism, environmental ethicists dismiss 
consequentialism as a whole rather than simply dismiss the utilitarian theory of value.  
(B) Relatedly, environmentalists sometimes describe nature as being sacred and such an 
attitude is incompatible with a consequentialist view in which in principle any aspect 
of nature may be sacrificed for the greater good.  
(C) Those who are attracted to consequentialism within mainstream philosophical ethical 
theory have been steered away from working primarily in environmental ethics 
because of a general distrust of applied ethics, and perhaps also because of the 
specific history in 20th century environmental philosophy with its metaphysically odd 
Deep Ecological or Heideggerian tendencies.  
(D) Those who are attracted to consequentialism outside mainstream philosophical ethical 
theory and who are interested in environmental issues become environmental 
economists rather than environmental ethicists.  
(E) Consequentialist theories, given their technical and calculative nature, are more likely 
to be endorsed by philosophers with personality traits that are not often found 
alongside personality traits that lead people to be nature lovers.  
These are mere speculations, though we do believe that there is at least a kernel of truth in each. 
Our overall sense is that the reason why there aren’t more consequentialist environmental 
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ethicists has more to do with historical and sociological contingencies rather than with what the 
questions within environmental ethics dictate. 
Nevertheless, consequentialist environmental ethics is not entirely new. Even before the 
environmental movements of the 1960’s and 1970’s, individuals such as Gifford Pinchot (1998 
[1947]) argued on utilitarian grounds for not overusing natural resources, since doing so would 
not be in the best long-term interest of humans. This view is still a fully anthropocentric view, 
but other consequentialists, such as Singer, have argued (as noted above) that traditional 
utilitarianism shows that we have obligations to promote the welfare of non-human animals who 
are sentient. However, Singer’s utilitarian view does not ground the kind of obligations that 
Sylvan believes humans have to non-sentient organisms such as trees, as well as to species as a 
whole. On Leopold’s view, acts are morally correct insofar as they promote the “integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the biotic community” (1980: 262); this view is fully non-anthropocentric 
but is very radical in its implications since most human activity disrupts some biotic system. 
Clearly, there are many ways to apply consequentialist theories to environmental issues, and 
many open questions.  
First, there are deep questions concerning axiology. These can be placed into two 
categories, first-order axiological questions and higher-order questions. For the former, the key 
question is, what kinds of things are valuable (or, are parts of valuable states of affairs)? There is 
a long list of candidates: human experiences, persons as a whole, other sentient animals, non-
sentient animals, other individual living organisms, individual non-living things, species, 
ecosystems, the Earth (perhaps including its atmosphere), the cosmos as a whole. For higher-
order axiological questions, one might wonder the following: Is there only one source of value or 
is there a pluralism of values? If the latter, how can one compare competing values? An 
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additional concern is whether the bearers of value are objects or states of affairs – do 
environmental goods fit more naturally into the former or the latter? Relatedly, if what is 
valuable in nature is not stasis but events in ever-changing ecosystems, and if we view human 
beings not as being separate from nature but as parts of ecosystems, can we then view human 
actions themselves as having value? If so, must we reject consequentialism? Finally, does 
something’s being natural entail that human intervention in it would cause it to lose value? Or 
can two places which are otherwise identical in terms of their intrinsic physical properties have 
different intrinsic values if one has been created by humans and the other exists apart from 
human intervention? If so, how can this be squared with consequentialist theory? 
 The essays in Part I of this book address these questions. In “The Bearers of Value in 
Environmental Ethics,” Katie McShane discusses a general concern which may differentiate 
consequentialist and Kantian environmental ethical theories. McShane argues that the fact that 
consequentialist theories typically focus on the value of states of affairs and non-consequentialist 
theories typically focus on the value of persons or individual things makes a significant 
difference with regard to the two types of theories’ approaches. McShane concludes that 
although we may find the Kantian approach more familiar, consequentialists’ emphasis on states 
of affairs makes it better suited to respond to environmental problems.  
Robin Attfield has long been at the forefront of consequentialist environmental ethics. In 
a series of works (1991, 1999, and 2003), Attfield has explicated and defended biocentric 
individualism, the view that what has value are the goods of living creatures. On Attfield’s 
consequentialist view, living beings all have interests and capabilities in defending their own 
good, and this makes their flourishing valuable, although Attfield’s view is inegalitarian – it is 
not the case that the good of all living things is of equal value. In his paper in this volume, "Can 
14 
 
Biocentric Consequentialism Meet Pluralist Challenges?" Attfield defends this view from 
criticisms from Alan Carter, and Attfield shows how consequentialist biocentric individualism 
accounts for other claims of moral considerability (such as for species and ecosystems). 
 Avram Hiller’s “System Consequentialism” incorporates a holistic environmental 
worldview within consequentialist theory. The view has two main aspects. First, we should 
morally consider natural systems as part of consequentialist calculus. Second, since humans are 
natural beings and systemically depend upon other humans and on the natural world, when a 
typical human action is performed, consideration must be given to whether the action and its end 
together comprise a good system. Human actions, then, may have value other than merely 
instrumental value.  
Alan Carter defends a pluralist version of consequentialism in his “Indirect, 
Multidimensional Consequentialism,” a view which he has also laid the groundwork for in other 
important work (e.g. 2011a and 2011b). Carter first argues that consequentialism need not 
contain an injunction to maximize value. Then Carter defends the view that there is a plurality of 
values, and shows that this multidimensional axiology grounds an environmental ethic that is 
preferable to those offered by monistic views. Carter gives a detailed account of the structure of 
consequentialist theory if we countenance a plurality of values.  
Ben Bradley’s paper "Why Leave Nature Alone?" argues against the idea that there is a 
neutral state of human non-interference (“moral inertia”) which is relevant in comparing 
outcomes. For Bradley, this means that neither consequentialist nor nonconsequentialist theories 
can easily claim that there is something intrinsically bad about disrupting wilderness. To claim 
that human action in wilderness causes it to lose value is to be chauvinistic regarding human 
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action – such a claim depends upon an unprincipled distinction between human and nonhuman 
activities.  
 Since consequentialist theories contain both an account of what is valuable and an 
account of right action, the essays in Part I about what is of value do not on their own provide a 
full picture of the pros and cons of consequentialist environmental ethics. Furthermore, a number 
of specific issues arise when attempting to apply consequentialist theories directly to real-world 
environmental issues. Thus there are many other open questions for consequentialist 
environmental ethics.  
An important category of concerns connecting consequentialism to environmental ethics 
regards uncertainty in assessing the value of outcomes. There are several related issues here. 
First, there is tremendous uncertainty about the long-term environmental consequences of 
actions, and this uncertainty may render consequentialism inadequate as a practical means of 
responding to environmental questions. Second, there is the famous non-identity problem (Parfit, 
1984, Ch. 16), where those future individuals (both human and non-human) who will be 
adversely affected by anthropogenic environmental problems will owe their very existence to our 
actions, and any harm-based theory of right action will need a solution to the problem. Third, due 
to uncertainty about what features of the environment are morally considerable, we may not have 
a decision procedure to decide which actions are best. Fourth, there may be special ethical 
questions that arise due to the potential of environmental catastrophe that are not normally 
considered in typical discussions of individual harm. Fifth, there are political issues regarding 
how political actors must consider the interests of those who cannot play a role in public policy 
deliberation because they are not yet born or are not human. 
16 
 
A wedge issue in distinguishing consequentialist from nonconsequentialist theories is 
whether it is acceptable to directly cause some harm in the service of a greater good. This 
question arises prominently in environmental ethics since so many of our actions cause some 
harm to the environment and to people in a way that is hard if not impossible to avoid. Is it 
possible for such harm ever to be justified? If not, is there a way to remedy the harm? Finally, 
although there are deep social and political questions about the environment that consequentialist 
theories ought to address, there are also personal questions. How does consideration of the 
environment affect our day-to-day decisions on how to act? What makes for the best life for a 
person given our current environmental situation? 
 The selections in Part II of this book address most of the questions mentioned in the 
preceding two paragraphs, with some authors defending the consequentialist approach and others 
rejecting it. In “On Some Limitations of Consequentialism in the Sphere of Environmental 
Ethics,” Alan Holland argues that a consequentialist framework will rarely be acceptable in 
making environmental decisions. This is because environmental issues typically occur at a large 
scale (both spatial and temporal) that cannot be delimited in advance, and thus consequences of 
actions cannot easily be determined at the time of decision-making. However, Holland accepts 
that an evaluation of consequences still must play a role in environmental decision-making even 
if environmental decisions cannot be made solely on the basis of an evaluation of consequences.  
 It is worth inquiring what we should do if, as is arguably the case, the axiological issues 
discussed in Part I of this book are unresolved. In “Evaluative Uncertainty, Environmental 
Ethics, and Consequentialism,” Krister Bykvist argues that in addition to the uncertainty 
regarding the long-term consequences of actions, there is moral uncertainty about what things 
have value. Although Bykvist’s paper relates to axiological issues, his main concern is a 
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structural issue for consequentialism in dealing with moral uncertainty. In parallel to how 
Holland argues that empirical uncertainty may undermine consequentialist approaches to 
environment ethics, Bykvist argues that moral uncertainty may be problematic for 
consequentialists. Unlike Holland, however, Bykvist argues that the solution to this problem 
does not require any radical changes to traditional consequentialist theory. Instead, Bykvist 
argues that once a distinction is made between what is morally right and what is rational, a 
consequentialist framework is still appropriate. 
 The next three papers in the volume address the issue of whether and how it is possible to 
offset in an appropriate manner environmental damages we cause. Allen Habib argues in “Future 
Generations and Resource Shares” that typical ways of understanding our responsibility to offset 
the depletion of natural resources we cause, such as Brian Barry’s view, are misguided. Instead, 
Habib argues that one must consider what he calls “window resources,” since what resources are 
needed shifts over time, and just distribution across generations must account for these shifts.  
 In “Can We Remediate Wrongs?” Benjamin Hale argues that environmental 
considerations undermine consequentialism. If what is wrong with environmental pollution is the 
harm that it causes, as a consequentialist would hold, then pollution would be permissible from a 
consequentialist perspective if the harms could be remedied. However, Hale argues that there is 
no way to remedy some damages caused by pollution; what is really wrong with pollution is that 
it is a kind of trespass. Hale claims that restitution and reconciliation are also necessary in 
responding to environmental damages, but that these do not fit in a consequentialist framework.  
 In “Moral Bookkeeping, Consequentialism, and Carbon Offsets,” Julia Driver addresses 
the question of whether offsetting the damages we cause due to anthropocentric climate change 
using carbon offsets is acceptable. Although some may argue that such offsetting also considers 
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eco-systems which have been harmed by people, and argues that a consequentialist perspective is 
better than a non-consequentialist perspective in handling such cases. After discussing the notion 
of restitution generally, Driver argues, unlike Hale, that those who harm nature can compensate 
for that harm. There are many trade-offs we make in day-to-day life, and carbon offsets are 
indeed a way of maintaining an acceptable moral bookkeeping.  
 The final paper in Part II and in the book as a whole is Wendy Donner’s “John Stuart 
Mill's Green Liberalism and Ecofeminism.” Donner uses Mill’s prescient views on the “Art of 
Life” to formulate an environmentally-informed view of the good life for a person. Donner 
argues that the good life is a simple life which is rich in appreciation of natural beauty and which 
avoids the excesses of materialism. Donner shows that this understanding of the proper place of 
humans in the natural world applies more than ever to today.  
 
* * * 
We are confident that anyone concerned with either practical environmental issues or with 
ethical theory will find much of value in these pages. Ethical theory quite generally stands to 
gain from the development of a consequentialist environmental ethic, and criticisms based in 
environmental concerns made by opponents of consequentialism (such as those in this volume) 
must be answered for consequentialism to be generally viable. Furthermore, resolution of the 
pressing environmental issues of our era would be aided by the development of an adequate 
theoretical framework, and though there is much work yet to be done, we hope that this book is a 
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1 Readers who seek a more comprehensive treatments of consequentialism would be well-served 
by starting with Mulgan (2001: 25-52), Brink (2005), and Driver (2012).  
2 We ignore, for the sake of simplicity, cases in which there are two or more actions, F1 and F2, 
which A can do which have equally valuable consequences and in which there is no other action, 
F3, which A can do which has more valuable consequences than F1 or F2. 
3 Concerns of this sort come and go. See Nozick (1981: 494-498), Raz (1986: 268-269), and 
Dreier (1993) and more recently Portmore (2007) and Brown (2011). 
4 Of course, one need not be a consequentialist to hold this view – but it helps. Epicurus was 
arguably one welfarist who did not embrace consequentialism (Annas 1993: 293-301). Perhaps 
Hume was another (Gill 2011). 
5 Interested readers might pursue these matters in far greater detail in Griffin (1986), White 
(2006), and Feldman (2012), among many other sources. 
6 To be sure, the reader may experience vertigo when thinking through the possibilities. One 
might a subjectivist inclusivist welfarist actual act consequentialist, or one might be an extra-
welfarist actual rule consequentialist, or might be an objectivist exclusivist welfarist expected act 
consequentialist, and so on. But every serious ethical theory must take on issues of this sort, and 
consequentialism is no exception 
7 In addition to some of the contributors to this volume, Robert Elliot (1997) and Dale Jamieson 
(2002, vii) have explicitly done so. (Also see Jamieson and Elliot 2009.) Elliot (2001, 181) also 
notes the paucity of avowed consequentialist environmental ethicists.  
8 Many thanks to Emily Hodges for her research assistance and to Ramona Ilea for her helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this Introduction. 
                                               
